High school student Abdulbasit Ablimit, 17, died on the spot after he was shot from behind by policemen on patrol late Saturday in Kelpin county in Aksu prefecture, while the two other Uyghurs who suffered gunshot wounds have been detained, the residents said.

“I’m not sure whether he did not see the red light signal or he intentionally beat the red light,” a Kelpin county employee told RFA’s Uyghur Service, speaking on condition of anonymity. “The police shot him from behind and killed him.”

“In our county, traffic police always stop motorcyclists and check their license and ID card,” said another resident, also speaking anonymously. “Possibly, the young guy did not have any documents with him and, fearing he would be fined, sped away and was shot by the police.”

Anger

The shooting sparked anger among family members and relatives of the three students from Qum’eriq village in Yurchi township as well as other residents, all of whom marched to the county office carrying Ablimit’s body wrapped in white cloth to protest the police action.

“About 400 to 500 people took part in the march, hoisting Ablimit’s body,” the Kelpin county employee said.

“They demanded that the authorities provide quick answers to the circumstances that led to the shooting,” he said. “They also wanted the policeman who killed Abdulbasit to be punished according to the law.”

Security forces blocked the path of the protesters but they changed course and marched towards Yurchi township and were again prevented from reaching their destination, eyewitnesses said.

Protests dispersed

Eventually, the security forces brutally dispersed the demonstration, beating and detaining a dozen Uyghurs, including Ablimit’s uncle Mahmut Hesamidin, they said.

“The police harshly broke up the protests, detaining 10 to 15 people and seizing Abdulbasit’s body,” according to an eyewitness.

“Abdulbasit, who lost his father when he was one year old, may have fled from the police in order to prevent his mom from paying a traffic fine of about 200 to 300 yuan [U.S. $32 to U.S. $48],” he said.

Another eyewitness who spoke to RFA said the families of the two injured pillion riders were concerned about their well-being.

“They don’t know where the two boys are being held. They only know that they were riding pillion on Abdulbasit’s motorcycle and were injured in the shooting.”

Yurchi police confirmed the shooting and protests but declined to provide details.

Police in Gezlik township, which is close to Yurchi, also confirmed the incident but told RFA to contact the local government office for details.

“Now the situation is peaceful and under control,” a Gezlik police officer said.

Tense situation

But residents said the situation was tense in Kelpin county with armed security forces patrolling the streets.

“I live near the suburbs of Kelpin town and I see armed security forces and military trucks passing by the streets. The situation is still tense.”

China has intensified a sweeping security crackdown in Xinjiang, where according to official figures about 100 people, mostly Uyghurs, are believed to have been killed over the past year for alleged links to terrorism and separatism.

Many Uyghurs complain that they are subject to political, cultural, and religious repression for opposing Chinese rule in the resource-rich region.

http://www.rfa.org/english/video?param=value&storyId=Uyghur-MotorcycleDeath

ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TURKISTAN Uyghur Foundation Stichting Oeigoeren Nederland Stichting Uighur Jurat Barat  Stichting Uyghur Oost-Turkestan Uyghur Logo Nederlanders Holland Europe HUMAN RIGHTS  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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It was not immediately clear from the brief report by the official Xinhua news agency if any of the death sentences would be commuted, as sometimes happens in China.

Another person was give life imprisonment, Xinhua said. It gave no other details.

State television showed deserted streets and heavy security around the courthouse, which it said was closed for all other business.

Last month, China announced the first charges to be laid in connection with the unrest, with 21 people charged with murder, arson, robbery and damaging property during ethnic riots that erupted in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, on July 5.

In Xinjiang’s worst ethnic violence in decades, Uighurs attacked majority Han Chinese in Urumqi, after taking to the streets to protest against attacks on Uighur workers at a factory in southern China in June that left two Uighurs dead.

Han Chinese in Urumqi sought revenge two days later.

The violence left 197 people dead, mostly Han Chinese, and wounded more than 1,600, according to official figures. (Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Chris Buckley and Alex Richardson)

www.alertnet.org

ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TURKISTAN Uyghur Foundation Stichting Oeigoeren Nederland Stichting Uighur Jurat Barat  Stichting Uyghur Oost-Turkestan Uyghur Logo Nederlanders Holland Europe HUMAN RIGHTS  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Erkin Alptekin Rebiya Kadeer

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Presuming this is widespread and despite recent media attention, it probably still deserves to be briefly reiterated that, after struggles for independence and two short-lived attempts at forming small republics within the region in the first half of last century, Xinjiang was brought under the control of the CCP when the PLA entered in 1949, an event that many consider to be an invasion and was anything but peaceful or without bloodshed. The exploitation of the region’s resources, which include significant oil and natural gas reserves, began soon after annexation. It was in 1955 that Xinjiang became a so-called Autonomous Region; however, as with all such regions in China—including Inner Mongolia, which was established after a land grab in the mid 19th century—despite the conditions of autonomy being written into law, it has received less than what it legally deserves, with serious consequences.

It is now more widely known that the people of Xinjiang have suffered many parallel hardships to those of the Tibetans as a direct result of the contempt demonstrated by the Chinese regime’s policies and the negative views that it persistently perpetuates, all of which serve only to exacerbate tensions. Moreover, if you were to go to the eastern areas of China, you would find migrants from Xinjiang trying to survive in harsh conditions, gaining a reputation as untrustworthy, petty criminals in the process, and suffering callous discrimination by many of the Han majority who show little interest in understanding the stereotypes being employed and the causes of the Xinjiang people’s predicament.

Unfortunately for Xinjiang, Tibet has several advantages in its favor. As far as religions are concerned, for an international audience, Tibetan Buddhism has many attractive, colorful and exotic elements that can be readily found appealing, such as the story of the search for the Dalai Lama and the beliefs surrounding his status, which provides a compelling narrative, even without sharing Buddhist beliefs; whereas, the Uyghurs have the misfortune of being Islamic, with all that historically and currently entails. Although Rebiya Kadeer has stated an interest in becoming something like the Dalai Lama, due to the significant cultural and religious differences between the two autonomous regions, it will be an uphill battle for her to elevate the issues of Xinjiang to anywhere near the same level of international recognition as those of Tibet.

Furthermore, given China’s record, we shouldn’t delude ourselves about what can be achieved inside China by political campaigning and attempting to increase issue awareness internationally; the Chinese authorities have just about proven since 1949 that they will do what they want regardless of the opinion of the wider international community. Indeed, the way the CCP treats its political targets can be likened to a prisoner wearing a straight jacket: if they don’t like wearing it, and they struggle, it’ll just be pulled tighter. If Rebiya Kadeer does end up following the path of the Dalai Lama, perhaps we’re in for little more than a series of international promotional tours and cycles of media attention that span decades with very little to no real progress being made inside China’s boarders, unless, of course, substantive change somehow occurs in Beijing.

Robert Burns is an Australian based commentator with an interest in international issues.

www.theepochtimes.com

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According to Xinhua, the state news agency, Mr. Hu visited rural areas and factories; a major oil center; and the regional capital, Urumqi, where the rioting occurred.

On Tuesday, he told government officials and security forces that stability was a top priority in the region. “The key to our work in Xinjiang is to properly handle the relation between development and stability in the region,” Xinhua quoted him as saying.

Reporters gathered in Xinjiang this week in anticipation of the start of trials related to the riots. But an official with the news media office of the local Communist Party headquarters said that he had no information that any such trials would take place this week.

The official, Li Hua, said Tuesday by telephone that a report on Monday in China Daily, a state-run English-language newspaper, had incorrect information on the timeline for the trials. Some Chinese Web sites and foreign news organizations, including The New York Times, ran articles based on the China Daily report.

“Of course they have to be tried, just not according to the timeline of the China Daily story,” Mr. Li said, referring to the scores of men, mostly ethnic Uighurs, charged with taking part in the riots. Mr. Li said he had no information on exactly when the trials would start.

The China Daily article, published on the front page, said that more than 200 suspects had been formally charged with an array of crimes related to the rioting that began on July 5, and that trials were expected to start this week in Urumqi. The article cited an unnamed court official.

It also said the local police had gathered 3,318 pieces of evidence, including bricks and clubs stained with blood.

Some Chinese and foreign reporters have waited in Urumqi for the trials to start. In late July, China Daily had reported that the trials would start in August.

On Tuesday, Global Times, a newspaper published by the Communist Party’s main news organization, reported that the government had not yet set a date for the trial and that the number of suspects remained at 83. Global Times quoted Hou Hanmin, a spokeswoman for the Xinjiang regional government, saying that the China Daily report was “totally untrue.”

The announcement of a trial date on a matter as delicate as the ethnic riots would usually be reported first through Xinhua. But Xinhua had yet to report on any fixed date as of late Tuesday.

The conflicting reports appeared to be an indication of growing competition among official news organizations in China as senior officials encourage more aggressive reporting on topics of international interest.

On July 5, mobs of Uighurs, Turkic-speaking people who make up the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, stormed through the streets of Urumqi after clashes between Uighur protesters and riot police officers. The initial protesters had been holding a rally over the killing of Uighurs in an earlier ethnic brawl at a factory in southeastern China.

In the violence in Urumqi, at least 197 people were killed and 1,721 injured, most of them Han civilians, according to state news organizations. It was the deadliest ethnic riot in China in decades. The Han are the dominant ethnic group in China.

In the days afterward, Han vigilantes armed with sticks and knives went into Uighur neighborhoods to exact revenge.

Uighurs in Urumqi say the government has not given an accurate count of Uighur casualties.

source: www.nytimes.com

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Chinese Government and Chinese Media Accounts of the Project–50,000 Households To Be Resettled

Under a 30 billion yuan (US$4.39 billion) project launched in late February with funds from the central and XUAR governments, authorities will “reconstruct” the Old City of Kashgar within a five-year period and resettle roughly 50,000 households, or more than 200,000 people, according to reports from Chinese government and media sources. Based on the reports, the number of people affected approaches half of the Kashgar city population. (For information on the planning stages of the project, see an August 13, 2008, report from the Kashgar district government Web site describing a meeting of government and Communist Party officials to address construction plans. For reports from the initial stages of construction and resettlement in February, see February 27 reports from Xinjiang Daily and Xinjiang News Net (1, 2), and a February 28 report from China News Net. For subsequent reporting, see a March 27 article from the Kashgar district government Web site, detailed report from Yaxin dated March 23, May 27 report from Xinhua Xinjiang, and June 8 Yaxin report. Figures on the exact number of people and households affected, as reported in these articles, varies.) According to the August report from the Kashgar district government, the project to “reconstruct” the Old City has received longstanding central government attention, and the impetus to implement it came after the May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province. The Yaxin article reported that nearly 60% of the Old City houses, made of clay and wood, date from the 1950s and 1960s, and that poor construction has impeded infrastructure improvements and made the area vulnerable to earthquake damage. The information in the Yaxin report conflicts with earlier government reporting on the age of the buildings in the Old City. A 2007 report on the Kashgar district government Web site describes many of the buildings as older than 400 years old and describes most individual residences as more than 50 to 80 years old, with some as old as 150 years old.

Demolition and Resettlement Plans Linked to Ethnic Issues

In addition to stated concerns about earthquakes, the first February 27 Xinjiang News Net report said the dangers posed by the buildings also affected factors including “economic development, ethnic unity, and the reinforcement of Xinjiang’s borders.” In the August article, a government official also raised political concerns, describing Kashgar as an area where Uyghurs are most heavily concentrated and an area in the “front ranks” in the XUAR’s fight against separatism, terrorism, and infiltration.

According to the February articles and March Yaxin article, the first group of residents affected by the initial stages of the project have been resettled in earthquake-proof high-rises in a suburb of the city. The Yaxin article reported that all the Old City families resettled as a result of the project will receive monetary compensation or replacement housing. Authorities will also take measures to establish businesses to help sustain the livelihoods of relocated populations, according to the report. The August 2008 article reported that some 23,000 subsistence-level and lower-income households affected by the project would “mainly be provided with low-cost rental housing or affordable housing to facilitate relocation,” while residents “with resources but unwilling to leave” would receive subsidies for building new earthquake-proof housing on site or elsewhere. According to the August report, as of that date, the XUAR government already had re-designated townships in the Kashgar suburbs as towns and begun converting farmland in preparation for resettling affected populations. The report described efforts to distribute propaganda materials and launch “ideological mobilization” to garner support for the project. See also the March 23 Yaxin report for additional information on mobilizing support for the project by broadcasting images of the Sichuan earthquake. Overseas media reports, citing local residents, have challenged the adequacy of compensation and scope of local support for the project. See below for details.

Earlier plans to address infrastructure in the Old City date to a 2001 “Implementing Project for Safeguarding the Famous Historical and Cultural City of Kashgar and Taking Precautions to Quake-Proof the Old City” according to the Yaxin report. (See the 2007 Kashgar government report for additional information on earlier efforts to address the issue starting in 1999.) The 2001 project planned to invest 600 million yuan (US$87.8 million) into reinforcing and safeguarding key residences and relics, but came to a halt due to various factors including funding, according to the Yaxin report. Under existing efforts launched since 2001 to earthquake-proof the area, 2,500 households already have moved to earthquake-resistant housing, according to the second Xinjiang News Net report and a February 2 report from the Kashgar district government Web site. Authorities also have carried out other efforts to demolish and reconstruct parts of Kashgar. See, e.g., a July 16, 2005, Telegraph article on demolitions near the Id Kah mosque.

Preservation Efforts Minimal–Most Buildings To Be Demolished

Details of the Kashgar demolition project indicate shortcomings in both the project’s capacity to protect the cultural heritage of the Old City as well as in the Chinese government’s overall framework for cultural heritage protection, including as it relates to ethnic minorities’ right to preserve their culture. At the August 2008 meeting to discuss the “reconstruction” of the Old City, as reported in the August 2008 article, officials indicated that efforts to preserve existing structures would be minimal. While authorities from various government agencies took part in the meeting, no officials from cultural heritage offices were reported to attend. Speaking at the event, the Kashgar district Communist Party secretary described the “reconstruction” of the Old City as a “human-centered” project and stressed that “what [the project] will protect is a construction style with ethnic features, and what it won’t protect is dangerous old raw earth houses that endanger the people’s safety.” Noting that the Old City contained the world’s largest complex of raw earth structures, a government official spoke of the importance of preserving the “historical style and regional features” of the Old City, but cautioned against wide-scale preservation:

The reconstruction of the Old City must take place under the premise of protecting historical and regional features, but some experts and scholars propose retaining the original appearance of Kashgar’s Old City, and we think that [view] is out of touch with reality. Preservation of the people’s lives, property, and safety must be placed first. Otherwise, if a fairly large earthquake strikes, not only will the people’s lives and property receive damage, but the historic area will similarly be destroyed in a flash. Moreover, according to general surveys, buildings in the Old City with real historic preservation value are very few. We’ll resolutely protect the buildings with historic preservation value, but we can’t take every old and shabby building and keep them all. The facts will inevitably show that the Old City after its reconstruction not only will not have destroyed the Uyghurs’ history and culture but will have inherited and developed the Uyghurs’ history and culture. Using the excuse of protecting the history and culture of a famous old city to impede the Old City’s restructuring shows extreme irresponsibility toward the safety of the lives of the 220,000 Old City residents of all ethnicities.

The official added that recently constructed buildings would be renovated to make them earthquake-proof, while the “few” buildings with preservation value would be repaired and reinforced. The official did not provide details on the process of determining which buildings have preservation value. According to a May 27 New York Times article, officials report that at least 85 percent of the area will be demolished. Authorities cited in the article said they would rebuild some parts of the Old City using a “Uyghur style” of architecture, in line with the Kashgar district Communist Party secretary’s statement on using “a construction style with ethnic features.” The statements did not provide additional information on how such “ethnic features” or “Uyghur styles” are defined. (For an example of interpretations of “Islamic-style” architecture and “ethnic character” within a reconstruction project in a Hui Muslim neighborhood in Beijing, see pp. 146-148 within Daniel B. Abramson, “The Aesthetics of City-scale Preservation Policy in Beijing,” Planning Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2007): 129-166.) According to a book cited in the New York Times article, describing Kashgar before the Old City demolition, “Kashgar is the best-preserved example of a traditional Islamic city to be found anywhere in Central Asia” (George Michell, Kashgar: Oasis City on China’s Old Silk Road, Frances Lincoln, 2008, p. 79). The 2007 report from the Kashgar government Web site also stressed the historic character of the Old City and expressed support for preservation principles.

The government official did not address how the determination that few buildings hold preservation value relates to Kashgar’s designation as a national-level historic and cultural city with historic districts within the Old City. Kashgar received the designation in 1986, as recorded in a government notice from that year. (See also the 2007 Kashgar government report for information on historic districts within the city.) The 1986 designation adheres to a 1982 notice on preserving cities with historic value or significance to China’s modern revolutionary history. Since then, the Chinese government has codified its process for designating and protecting historic cities into a Regulation on the Protection of Famous Historic and Cultural Cities, Towns, and Villages (Historic Cities Regulation). Both the Historic Cities Regulation and article 14 of the broader Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage call for preservation efforts for designated historic areas, and article 28 of the Historic Cities Regulation specifically forbids new construction or expansion in the centers of historic districts, with the exception of infrastructure installation. The article also details the procedures for gaining permission to carry out construction. Despite stipulating protections for historic areas, some provisions within the regulation are poorly defined, thus appearing to permit wide latitude in determining what kind of structures qualify for legal protections. For example, article 47(1) of the Historic Cities Regulation defines historic architecture (which is protected under the regulation) to mean certain structures designated by the government that “have definite preservation value and can reflect historical styles and regional features.” The regulation does not detail how or by whom “preservation value” and ethnic and local “features” are defined, calling into question the capacity of Chinese law for effective cultural heritage preservation, including as it accords with ethnic minorities’ right to define and protect their culture, and the state’s obligation to secure this right.

In the case of the Kashgar project, ambiguities in the framework for heritage protection contribute to the formal leeway for authorities to take a narrow view of which structures have historic value and qualify for protection, thus removing most of the buildings in the Old City from the formal protections of the Historic Cities Regulation. Authorities also have excluded possible international mechanisms to preserve the Old City that would have come with its inclusion on a list of proposed Silk Road locations for entry in the UNESCO World Heritage List. (The Silk Road list’s proposed sites include cities, but exclude locations within Kashgar except for the tomb of Mehmud Qeshqeri.) See the New York Times article for additional information. The Chinese government has formally committed itself to preserve its cultural heritage not only through its domestic legislation but also through its ratification of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention.

Details of the project also suggest that authorities have bypassed ways to protect Old City residents’ safety while preserving existing buildings. Standards set by professionals in the field of cultural heritage preservation indicate compatibility between historic preservation and measures to guard against natural disaster. Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas, adopted by the non-governmental International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and available on its Web site, recognize the importance of introducing “contemporary elements” and preventative measures against natural disasters while ensuring they are “adapted to the specific character of the properties concerned.” Scholar Ronald Knapp, cited in a May 3 National report, said that in the case of the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province, problems came about “more from very poor ‘modern’ construction rather than the shortcomings of traditional practices.”

XUAR Residents, NGO, Overseas Observers Object to Project

Reports from overseas media have indicated opposition to the project from local residents and some local officials, as well as concerns from local residents and outside observers about housing resettlement and historic preservation. A report from a Beijing-based NGO also has expressed concern about historic preservation and raised questions about procedural aspects of the project. (See the May 27 New York Times article, May 3 National report, March 25 and April 2 reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), a March 24 Washington Post article, March 24 Uyghur American Association (UAA) press release, March 26 South China Morning Post article (subscription required), April 3 article from openDemocracy, and undated report from the Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center.) An official from the Kashgar cultural relics management office, cited in the April 2 RFA report, said that the project was being implemented without adequate attention to historic preservation, and another official expressed concern about resettled residents’ ability to sustain their livelihoods, many of which were tied to workshops within the Old City. The UAA press release raised concerns that the population resettlement would increase government capacity to “control and monitor Uyghur activity” and pressure Uyghurs to assimilate. The openDemocracy article questioned the nature of future reconstruction in the city given a track record of co-opting cultural practices and redeveloping ethnic minority areas elsewhere in China to boost tourism. Kashgar was designated one of “China’s superior tourist cities” in 2004, according to a report that year from Tianshan Net. Authorities plan to rebuild part of the Old City as an “international heritage scenery” site to attract tourism, according to the National article.

Information from overseas reports also raise questions about the process of consulting with residents on the project and on adequate compensation. Two men cited in the National report said they had received no information about compensation and did not know where they would be relocated to, while other sources said that the government had not consulted with them about the demolition. Some Kashgar residents cited in the New York Times article said that compensation amounts were inadequate. Sources cited in both the Washington Post article and March 25 RFA report indicated dissatisfaction with the project but said they lacked the means to challenge the government. A source cited in the RFA article noted that people felt scared to voice their opinions. China’s Historic Cities Regulation specifies that authorities must solicit opinions from the public for restructuring projects (article 29). International standards also carve out a role for public input in preservation projects. Article 17(c) of UNESCO’s Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas calls for authorities to include the opinions and participation of the public. Article 3 of the ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas states, “The participation and the involvement of the residents are essential for the success of the conservation programme and should be encouraged. The conservation of historic towns and urban areas concerns their residents first of all.” Article 5 states, “The conservation plan should be supported by the residents of the historic area.”

The report from the Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center, a Beijing-based Chinese NGO, emphasized the preservation value of the Old City and expressed concern about procedural aspects of the project. The report noted the lack of detailed information on preservation efforts, including the full text of the city’s preservation plan. Chapter 3 of the Historic Cities Regulation stipulates that the governments of areas designated as historic cities must prepare and implement a preservation plan. The regulation also details other procedural steps necessary to alter designated historic areas. See, for example, articles 28 – 32 on provisions regarding infrastructure construction in designated historic areas. A December 12, 2008, article from the Kashgar government reports that officials submitted plans for the current reconstruction project to examination by scholars, which adheres to article 29 of the regulation.

Shortcomings in Property Protection

The complaints by residents affected by the project reflect continuing problems with property seizure and resettlement in China. China’s 2007 Property Law, which protects private property rights, addresses expropriation of and compensation for property (article 42). As noted in a recent examination of the law by legal scholar Mo Zhang, however, “the Property Law sets no standard or requirement to guarantee a fair and just process for the taking.” (Mo Zhang, “From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China,” Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 5, 2008, Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-39, p. 360, available through the Social Science Research Network Web site.) The Property Law also lacks a clear standard for “what constitutes the public interest to justify a taking” (p. 361). Among existing regulations that address takings, Zhang notes that the Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Management Regulation “has a focus on the advancement of urban development, and as such it does not make the fair process for takings a priority. On the contrary, it has a bias against owners of households.” (p. 360.)

Curbs Over Uyghurs’ Rights

While underscoring shortcomings in cultural heritage preservation and continuing problems with property seizure and resettlement in China, the Kashgar demolition project also draws attention to broader problems in China’s policies in ethnic minority areas and in the XUAR in particular. Although the XUAR is an officially designated ethnic minority autonomous region with legally stipulated guarantees for “ethnic minorities’ right to administer their internal affairs” (Preamble, Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law) and measures to protect ethnic minority culture and cultural heritage, the Kashgar project highlights the failure of the government to protect such rights in practice. (For specific Chinese legal provisions on ethnic minorities that focus on cultural heritage protection, see, e.g., article 38 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and article 25 of Provisions on Implementing the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.) The project, noted by a source in the New York Times article to have “unusually strong backing high in the government,” accompanies longstanding policies of control over the Uyghur population, including harsh security measures and steps to dilute ethnic identity and promote assimilation, as noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report and recent CECC analyses (1, 2, 3). The level of repression in the region undermines residents’ ability to protect their rights, even as more space for challenging government abuses has opened up in China.

Additional Resources

• For more information on responses within China to the project, see a survey posted on the Bulletin Board Service (BBS) of the Uyghur-language Web site Xabnam.com (also available in Latin script on the Uyghur American Association Web site’s discussion forum). See also a discussion on the BBS of the Uyghur-language Web site Diyarim.
• For more information on China’s framework for historic preservation and an examination of preservation projects in Beijing, see Daniel B. Abramson, “The Aesthetics of City-scale Preservation Policy in Beijing,” Planning Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2007): 129-166 and Daniel B. Abramson, “Beijing’s Preservation Policy and the Fate of the Siheyuan,” Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 2001): 7-22.
• For more information on property rights, see the CECC Virtual Academy page on Property Rights Resources.
• For more information on China’s legal framework for ethnic minority rights, see the “Special Focus” section within the CECC 2005 Annual Report and Section II–Ethnic Minority Rights in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports.
• For information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV–Xinjiang, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

www.cecc.gov

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HONG KONG and WASHINGTON—The family home of prominent Uyghur exile leader Rebiya Kadeer in northwestern China has been slated for demolition and her family has been served with an eviction notice, according to residents.

Two businessmen, members of China’s mostly Muslim Uyghur ethnic minority, said officials in northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) plan to raze the Akida Trade Center, the Rebiya Kadeer Trade Center, and a third smaller building.

The three buildings, located in the regional capital Urumqi, were formerly fully owned by the Kadeer family and are now managed by government authorities. The exiled Rebiya Kadeer currently lives in Washington.

One Uyghur businessman from Gulja (in Chinese, Yining), capital of the Ili Kazakh Prefecture, traveling in Kazakhstan said Urumqi authorities also gave notice of eviction to Uyghur merchants who owned stores in the building.

“Now, Uyghur merchants are forced to rent stores in other buildings owned by Han Chinese. The new buildings offered by the government are more expensive then Rebiya’s buildings, and the buildings are located in an area populated by Han Chinese,” he said.

The businessman said Uyghur merchants are either unable or unwilling to rent space in those areas because of higher tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese after violent riots erupted in Urumqi on July 5.

“It is difficult for Rebiya Kadeer’s relatives to find a place to rent in the current situation because Han Chinese hate them and Uyghurs are scared of [renting to] them,” he said.

Ahmetjan, a Uyghur merchant from Atush city in the far West of the remote Tarim Basin, said he had heard that merchants in Kadeer’s buildings were scrambling to prepare for the eviction.

“My uncle had to travel to Urumqi from Atush to find a new location for his business. He had a wholesale store in one of Rebiya’s buildings,” he said in a phone call from Kyrgyzstan, where he was traveling on business.

Thriving business community

Rebiya Kadeer speaking at the Rebiya Kadeer Trade Center, Dec. 15, 1997. Courtesy of the Kadeer family

The Akida Trade Center, which comprises 15 floors and 20,000 square meters of living space, also serves as a residence for Kadeer’s relatives, who draw an income by running a restaurant on the building’s first floor.

A total of 37 family members, including Kadeer’s sister, brothers, and grandchildren, live in the building.

The Kadeer Trade Center has served as the main wholesale center in the XUAR since it was established by Kadeer in 1990.

Several thousand Uyghur merchants have set up shop in both the Rebiya Kadeer Trade Center and the Akida Trade Center.

Both buildings are to be demolished for the construction of a public park, according to the eviction notice.

Local authorities were unavailable for comment.

‘Act of revenge’

Rebiya Kadeer condemned the move by Urumqi authorities as an “act of revenge against me and against Uyghurs over July 5.”

The official Chinese media has branded Kadeer the “mastermind” behind the ethnic riots and regularly accuses her of sponsoring separatist terrorism in the region.

She also voiced concern for her family members, who she said would face difficulty in finding a new source of income and place to live because they have been blacklisted by the government.

“I cannot believe this kind of retaliation—punishing the family members of a political dissident—can still occur in the 21st century. I had thought it was the last act of retaliation when the authorities forced my family to speak out against me on state-owned TV,” Kadeer said.

On Aug. 4, state-controlled television broadcast interviews with Kadeer’s son Kahar, daughter Rushangul and imprisoned son Alim, as well as with Kadeer’s younger brother Mehmet.

Kadeer maintains that her children and brother were compelled to make false accusations about her alleged role in the July 5 unrest.

The day before the interviews aired on television, official news media published a letter that accused Kadeer of having broken her promises not to participate in “ethnic splittism” when she left China.

The letter was signed by her children, their spouses, and five of her grandchildren.

Following her release from prison in 2005, and before her exile to the U.S., Chinese officials warned Kadeer against speaking out on behalf of Uyghurs in China, saying that if she continued to do so her children and businesses would be targeted.

When she later engaged in human rights advocacy in the United States, Chinese officials shut down her businesses and harassed her family members.

Following Kadeer’s election as president of the Uyghur American Association and the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, her sons Alim and Ablikim were detained and imprisoned for seven and nine years respectively.

“The Chinese will do whatever they can to stop my activities. Making my family homeless is probably just one of the measures they have planned,” she said.

Uyghur buildings razed

Kadeer said the buildings are two of the few remaining in Urumqi that were designed in Uyghur-style architecture.

Buildings with Chinese architecture have taken over the city in recent years.

“The authorities don’t want to see Uyghur-style buildings in the [Xinjiang] capital, and they don’t want to see my name anywhere in the city,” Kadeer said.

Officials began demolishing Uyghur-style buildings in the ancient city of Kashgar, in southwestern Xinjiang, a few months before the July 5 incident in Urumqi.

“They can erase my name from the building by demolishing it, but they cannot erase it from the hearts of my people,” she said.

Kadeer, 60, was a self-made millionaire in China and a favorite of the authorities until she spoke out about Beijing’s heavy-handed treatment of her people, who frequently complain of harassment and discrimination and suffer high unemployment.

She later spent six years in prison for opposing the government and was released into U.S. exile in 2005.

Since the Urumqi unrest, the Chinese government has harshly criticized the governments of Japan and Australia for granting Kadeer visas to travel to their countries on unofficial visits.

It has also attempted to prevent an independent Australian film festival from screening a documentary about Kadeer’s life.

source: www.rfa.org

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TURKISTAN Uyghur Foundation Stichting Oeigoeren Nederland Stichting Uighur Jurat Barat  Stichting Uyghur Oost-Turkestan Uyghur Logo Nederlanders Holland Europe HUMAN RIGHTS  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Erkin Alptekin Rebiya Kadeer

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Kazakhstan is home to the largest Uighur community outside China. About 500 people, many wearing the blue badges with white crescents of the Uighur independence movement, gathered at a mosque for a traditional ceremony.

In Xinjiang’s worst ethnic unrest in decades, Uighurs staged protests in the regional capital Urumqi on July 5 following a clash among migrant workers at a factory in south China that had led to two Uighur deaths.

The Urumqi violence left 197 people dead and more than 1,600 wounded, mostly members of the China’s ethnic Han majority, according to Chinese authorities.

Han Chinese launched revenge attacks on Uighurs in Urumqi days later. About 1,000 people, mostly Uighurs, have been detained in an ensuing crackdown by security forces.

Han migration into Xinjiang, home to Muslim Uighurs who speak a Turkic language and whose culture has strong links to Central Asia, has helped fuel the conflict.

“What is our goal? We want an independent state,” Kakhraman Khodzhaberdiyev, a vice president of the U.S.-based World Uyghur Congress, told the Almaty meeting.

“The current autonomy (of Xinjiang) is not real and we demand that its status be changed as a first step.”

Another Uighur community leader, Abdulla Ushurov, attacked what he said were Chinese attempts to portray Uighur protests as purely criminal riots.

“You cannot say that a group of people just started crushing everything,” he said.

“These are being described as criminal acts but it is a century-long fight for independence.”

Police in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, also home to a significant Uighur minority, detained two Uighur leaders after a similar rally this week, saying it had not been given official permission.

The Almaty city government had permitted the Thursday meeting.

source: www.reuters.com

ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TURKISTAN Uyghur Foundation Stichting Oeigoeren Nederland Stichting Uighur Jurat Barat  Stichting Uyghur Oost-Turkestan Uyghur Logo Nederlanders Holland Europe HUMAN RIGHTS  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Erkin Alptekin Rebiya Kadeer

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The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government is currently considering a draft regulation that would tighten formal legal prohibitions on children’s freedom of religion and parents’ right to impart religious teachings. A draft XUAR regulation on the protection of minors, submitted for deliberation to the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress in June, adds new language that elaborates on and tightens enforcement of an existing XUAR legal prohibition on children’s freedom of religion that already constitutes the harshest known legal provision on the issue within China. According to a June 1 report from Urumchi Online and June 8 report from Legal Daily (via MOFCOM’s China Market Order Net), the proposed draft specifies that parents or guardians “may not permit minors to be engaged in religious activities” and “no organization or individual may lure or force minors to participate in religious activities or use religion to obstruct minors’ compulsory education.” In addition, where minors are “lured” or “forced” into such activities, they “can ask for protection from schools, neighborhood committees, village committees, offices for the protection of minors, or public security organs,” and such “organizations or work units receiving requests for help must take measures in a timely manner and not refuse or shift responsibility.” The draft provisions under consideration “target the demands of real conditions in the region, consolidating the attack against the ‘three forces’ [terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism] and specially rectifying illegal religious activities,” according to the Urumchi Online report. The provisions also “are directed at the phenomenon in some places in Xinjiang of parents or other guardians forcing minors to believe in a religion or participate in religious activities,” according to the Legal Daily report.

The relevant legal provision currently in force in the XUAR, article 14 of the XUAR’s 1993 Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection of Minors, specifies that “parents or other guardians may not permit minors to be engaged in religious activities.” The wording in article 14 is unseen elsewhere in China. In the 2005 report Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China reported that neither the national Law on the Protection of Minors nor other provinces’ implementing measures include such a provision. Some other provincial-level regulations have dealt with aspects of religious practice among minors but are not as restrictive as the current provision in force in the XUAR or the draft provisions under deliberation. See, for example, article 33 of the Fujian Province Implementing Measures on the Law on the Protection of Minors (specifying that “no organization or individual may force, trick, or instigate a minor to believe in a religion or participate in feudal superstition activities”) and article 13 of the Inner Mongolia Implementing Measures on the Management of Venues for Religious Activity (specifying that “venues for religious activities must not recruit minors to join the religion”). A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) official stated in 2005 that no laws prohibit minors from believing in a religion and that parents may give a religious education to children, according to a March 16, 2005 press conference summary from the MFA. The national Regulation on Religious Affairs is silent on the issue of children’s freedom of religion and parents’ right to impart religious teachings to their children.

The formal legal restriction on children’s freedom of religion in the XUAR accompanies harsh measures implemented in practice, and the proposed regulation comes during a period of heightened controls over religion implemented in the region as part of wide-scale security measures and anti-separatism propaganda campaigns. As reported in previous Commission analysis (1, 2), recent controls over religion have targeted children among other groups. In addition, according to a June 5 report from Radio Free Asia (RFA), the Ili Intermediate People’s Court in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture sentenced 12 young Uyghur men in March 2009 to prison terms between 3 years to life for separatist crimes, based on what a family member described as their activities providing religious instruction to children. According to RFA, the men sentenced to the prison terms are Merdan Seyitakhun, Ahmetjan Emet, Mewlanjan Ahmet, Kurbanjan Semet, Dolkun Erkin, Omerjan Mehmet, Seydehmet Awut, Erkin Emet, Abdujilil Abdughupur, Abdulitip Ablimit, Mutelip Rozi, and Ubulkasim.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II–Freedom of Religion–Islam and Section IV–Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TURKISTAN Uyghur Foundation Stichting Oeigoeren Nederland Stichting Uighur Jurat Barat  Stichting Uyghur Oost-Turkestan Uyghur Logo Nederlanders Holland Europe HUMAN RIGHTS  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Erkin Alptekin Rebiya Kadeer

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In recent months, two local governments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) published reports on the government and Communist Party-led political training of Muslim women religious figures known as büwi. (Büwi is a Uyghur word transliterated in the Chinese-language reports cited here as buwei. See the next paragraph for more information on the term.) According to an April 4 report on the Peyziwat (Jiashi) county (Kashgar district) government Web site, government and Communist Party officials in Yéngi Mehelle (Yingmaili) township gathered the büwi of 10 local villages for training in government and Party policy toward religion and to sign a pledge to “uphold stability.” Based on the pledge, the women will refrain from “wearing veils or long dresses, teaching religious texts to students, and forcing other individuals to participate in religious activities.” As part of efforts to train all religious figures in rotation over a four-year period, the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in the XUAR already has provided training to 100 büwi, according to a June 4 report on the prefectural government Web site.

Some of the Chinese reports (including the Bayangol report discussed above as well as reports in the following paragraphs) define büwi as women who wash corpses and perform religious rites at the homes of the deceased. The term also broadly encompasses Muslim women with a level of religious knowledge who are able to read the Quran and provide religious instruction. (Information based on CECC staff interview. See also basic definitions in the Yulghun dictionary.) For a description of büwi specifically as “Women Sufi ritualists,” see an article on the “Music of the Uyghurs” by scholars Rachel Harris and Yasin Muhpul, posted on the Web site of the London Uyghur Ensemble.

The recent information on training büwi follows a proposal from the 2nd meeting of the 10th XUAR People’s Political Consultative Conference (XUAR PPCC), initiated by the Vice-Chairwoman of the XUAR Women’s Federation and dated December 23, 2008, on bringing büwi under government and Party management, according to a copy of the proposal posted April 2, 2009, on the XUAR PPCC Web site. The proposal states that büwi have existed in a “no-man’s land” without state oversight and calls for taking advantage of the women’s social status to spread the Party’s religious and ethnic policies among Muslim women. The proposal also states that failing to capitalize on büwi’s status to disseminate Party policy could permit “hostile elements within and outside of [China’s] borders” to use religious and ethnic customs to “carry out infiltration activities among women.” The proposal adds that in some ethnic minority areas, where “a religious atmosphere is comparatively strong,” women believers are devout and their thinking is “ignorant, lacking common sense and reason,” thus making them vulnerable to infiltration by the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. It also cites cases of such forces “using” büwi to carry out “illegal sermonizing activities.” In addition, the proposal expresses concern that in some areas, some ethnic minority women “still” wear face coverings and clothing with a “pronounced religious hue.” Moreover, many rural women believers have “limited social interaction,” “relatively weak capacity for distinguishing right from wrong,” and are susceptible to being “incited” or “misled” by “bad people.”

The proposal lists four measures to address the “problem” of lack of oversight of büwi and risks of “infiltration” by hostile forces. First, it calls for drawing büwi under official supervision so that büwi can aid in activities such as “educating women to differentiate lawful religious activities” from illegal ones and to differentiate “the bounds of ethnic social customs and religious activities.” In addition, büwi working in this capacity can report on religious activities and the state of women’s thinking to Party authorities and help curb cases of women’s participation in “illegal religious activities” and “underground sermonizing activities.” Second, the proposal recommends a system whereby büwi voluntarily apply for training and under which applications are vetted by the state-controlled Islamic associations at local levels. Under this system, preferred applicants are to be “politically reliable” and possess a “definite level of culture and knowledge of religious texts.” Third, the proposal calls for organizing an administrative body under the lead of the United Front Work Department–the Communist Party organization that among other things oversees religious communities in China–and including offices such as the public security bureau, women’s federations, Islamic associations, and ethnic and religious affairs offices. Finally, the proposal outlines the content of training, which includes studying such texts as “Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities” and conveying information on appropriate procedures for Muslim funerals. (See a copy of the “Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities” posted February 2, 2008, on the Chinggil (Qinghe) county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture government Web site.) (See also a condensed text similar to the proposal on büwi submitted as a suggestion at the 2nd meeting of the 10th XUAR PPCC, posted January 12, 2009, on the Web site of the XUAR PPCC.)

Although political consultative conferences have an advisory function and their proposals do not carry binding legislative force, the XUAR PPCC proposal may reflect a trend in increasing efforts to regulate the activities of büwi in the XUAR. (See a description of the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), posted March 4 on the China Daily Web site, and an undated introduction on the Web site of the National Committee of the CPPCC for background information on CPPCC proposals.) The proposal also underscores the role that women’s federations have played in serving as a bridge for government and Party policy in areas such as religious oversight and anti-separatism campaigns. See, for example, an April 7 report from Toqsu (Xinhe) county, Aqsu district (via Xinjiang Peace Net), describing “outstanding problems” in “bizarre” women’s apparel and noting that an expert invited by the XUAR Women’s Federation provided a “correct interpretation” of the Quran’s views toward women’s clothes. See also information in a previous CECC analysis on the role of a prefectural women’s federation in carrying out anti-separatism activities among women.

The Commission also has found reports of steps to train or supervise büwi and other people described as corpse washers prior to the late 2008 and 2009 proposal and reports. See, for example, 2007 reports from Chira, Lop, and Niye (Minfeng) counties, all within Hoten district (reports all via the Hoten district government Web site), describing steps by women’s federations through which female party cadres engage in “talks” with female corpse washers. Also in 2007, Yopurgha (Yuepuhu) county in Kashgar district trained 38 büwi and other personnel who wash corpses to inform villages about “legal” religious behavior and the Party’s religious policy, according to a report that year from the Yopurgha government Web site. In June 2007, the Maytagh (Dushanzi) district government in Qaramay city included corpse washers in classes about the “reactionary nature” of the “Islamic Liberation Party,” according to a report that month from the district government Web site.

The late 2008 and 2009 reports on the training of büwi come during a period of heightened controls over religion in the region implemented as part of broader security and anti-separatism campaigns. See previous Commission analysis (1, 2) for details. For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV–Xinjiang, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TURKISTAN Uyghur Foundation Stichting Oeigoeren Nederland Stichting Uighur Jurat Barat  Stichting Uyghur Oost-Turkestan Uyghur Logo Nederlanders Holland Europe HUMAN RIGHTS  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Erkin Alptekin Rebiya Kadeer

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